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Abstract: The fog of war—poor intelligence about the enemy—can frustrate even a well-prepared 
military force. Something similar can happen in intellectual debate. What I call the fog of debate is a 
useful metaphor for grappling with failures and dysfunctions of argumentative persuasion that stem 
from poor information about our opponents. It is distressingly easy to make mistakes about our 
opponents’ thinking, as well as to fail to comprehend their understanding of and reactions to our 
arguments. After describing the fog of debate and outlining its sources in cognition and communication, 
I consider a few policies we might adopt upon learning we are in this fog.  
 
KEY WORDS: epistemology, conflict, discourse, persuasion, interpersonal judgment, biases, 
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“What do you say? What? I do not understand you. Will you be kind enough 
to say it again? I understand you still less.”  
– Jean de La Bruyère (1645–1696) 
 
“I ceased [ . . . ] to believe that one can convince one’s opponents with 
arguments printed in books. It is not to do that, therefore, that I have taken 
up my pen, but merely so as to annoy them, and to bestow strength and 
courage on those on our own side, and to make it known to others that they 
have not convinced us.”  
– Georg Christoph Lichtenberg (1742–1799) 
 
“Machines don’t fight wars. Terrain doesn’t fight wars. Humans fight wars. 
You must get into the mind of humans. That’s where the battles are won.”  
– Colonel John Boyd, United States Air Force (1927–1997) 
 
 
∗ Department of Philosophy, Fordham University. Competing Interests: The author 
declares none. For helpful conversations and comments, I am grateful to Ian Axel Anderson, 
Andrew Bailey, Jared Celniker, David Christensen, Carlo DaVia, Peter Ditto, Xingming Hu, 
Madeline Jalbert, Samuel Kampa, Charlie Lassiter, William Lycan, Tom Noah, Andrew Rotondo, 
Peter Seipel, Eric Schwitzgebel, Claudia Vanney, Joseph Vukov, Peter Andrey Smith, Shane 
Wilkins, Benjamin Wilson, and an anonymous referee. I am especially grateful to E. J. Coffman, 
Peter Ditto, Brett Mercier, and Norbert Schwarz for insightful conversations and written 
comments. I want to thank audiences at Universidad Austral in October 2020 and Nanjing 
University in May 2021 for discussions of earlier versions of this essay. Finally, I acknowledge the 
John Templeton Foundation for its generous support of my research (grant 61014).  
2 
 
Shrouded in the fog of war, military commanders lack good intelligence about the 
enemy. They are uncertain about their enemy’s positions and strategic capabilities. “Many 
intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are 
uncertain,” observed Carl von Clausewitz, the Prussian military theorist and general.1 In 
the nineteenth century, the expression “fog of war” would have evoked “the opacity of the 
black powder battlefield”2—thick clouds of smoke, concealing enemy movements, 
burning observers’ eyeballs. In the theater of war, commanders experience the fog as 
uncertainty in judgment. 
The fog-of-war idea hints at a model for thinking about intellectual debate—any 
communication where we aim to persuade others using argument. As I’ll show, the fog of 
debate is a useful metaphor for grappling with some failures and dysfunctions of 
argumentative persuasion.3  
In ideal circumstances, we want to persuade other people by rational means. We 
share arguments—premises linked to a conclusion, where the former are offered in 
support of the latter. But often we lack accurate information about others’ actual thinking 
and do not recognize what evidence would move them rationally. And when our 
opponents react outwardly after hearing our arguments, we do not always know how to 
 
1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976 [1816–1830]), 117. 
2 Eugenia C. Kiesling, “On War without the Fog,” Military Review 81, no. 5 (2001): 85–87 
[at 85].  
3 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (Metaphors We Live By [Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1980]) discuss the metaphor “argument is war,” which they point out is reflected 
in all sorts of language: “Your claims are indefensible,” “I demolished their argument,” “He 
attacked every weak point in my argument,” “She shot down all of my arguments,” “My objection 
will blow up your claim,” and so on. Lakoff and Johnson contend in general that metaphor shapes 
how people think and act. Although I reject the idea that we should literally treat debate as a war, 
I have certainly ended up thinking that the “fog of debate” concept illuminates some facets of 
argumentative persuasion for the reason that the argument-is-war metaphor is entrenched deeply 
in language and culture—just as Lakoff and Johnson say. 
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interpret those reactions: their behavior does not reveal their thinking. Because of our 
ignorance, we might do a poor job calibrating our arguments to our audience. We use 
premises or inferences they will not accept. Our efforts to persuade are like a cannonball 
sailing off and landing in an empty field. Unaware that the angle of argument needs 
adjustment, we reload and keep firing away, feeling sure that victory in a dialectical war 
of attrition will be ours.  
The claim that armed conflict is obscure and confusing is intuitive, but the idea 
that persuasion has similar qualities could seem less compelling. As it happens, people 
argue about policy, ethics, and philosophy in the grips of “naïve realism,” the tendency to 
believe we view the world objectively.4 We presume we know who our opponents are, what 
they believe, and which arguments should convince them. We know how to set them 
straight. But if we are in the fog of debate, we had better not take so much for granted 
about our opponents. The way things appear to us cannot be trusted and so some other 
strategy for persuading them is advisable. Reflecting on the fog could lead us to better 
strategies.  
This essay has three parts: I articulate an account of the fog of debate (Section I), 
describe some of its sources (Section II), and then consider the practical matter of how to 





4 Lee Ross and Andrew Ward, “Naive Realism in Everyday Life: Implications for Social 
Conflict and Misunderstanding,” In E. S. Reed, E. Turiel, and T. Brown, eds., Values and 
Knowledge (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., 1996), 103–135. 
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Military commanders in the fog of war lack certain kinds of knowledge about 
enemy forces and the battlefield. Thinkers in the fog of debate lack certain kinds of 
knowledge about the people they want to persuade. To understand what the fog of debate 
is, we must identify what kinds of facts the fog obscures. 
Let me begin with an analogy. You stack tin cans in a row atop a fence and try to 
shoot them off with your Red Ryder BB gun. You squeeze off a shot, hear a metallic ping, 
and see a can drop—direct hit! After perfecting your shot for hours, you decide to make 
target practice somewhat more interesting. You put on a blindfold and earplugs, and then 
aim in the vicinity of the cans. What happens when you pull the trigger? Perhaps your 
shot nailed a can, grazed a can, or ricocheted and stunned a neighbor’s cat. Perhaps you 
are not even shooting in the right direction. You just can’t tell because you lack access to 
certain facts. Any judgment you make about the shot is unreliably formed, though not 
necessarily wrong.  
The Red Ryder example illuminates the causal chain of argumentative persuasion. 
In a prototypical debate situation, we know where our audience stands on an issue; we 
share an argument with them to change their minds; we know they comprehend our 
argument; we know they should accept its conclusion; and then we find out how they 
react. The fog of debate prevents us from seeing how all of this unfolds and where the 
chain might break down.  
Consider what facts the fog obscures. When trying to persuade others, we normally 
believe or presume some answers to these four questions: (i) What does our audience 
think about an issue? (ii) Do they understand our argument? (iii) Would they be justified 
in accepting its conclusion after they understand it? (iv) What does their behavior indicate 
about their thinking about the issue after they hear our argument? When our answers—
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believed or presumed—are significantly wrong or unreliably formed, we are in the fog of 
debate, as I use the term. We lack certain kinds of knowledge about our audience and our 
argument, because our answers to those questions are wrong or unreliably formed. 
Let me try to be more precise about these ideas. For any argument we share with 
an audience, the following four conditions may or may not hold:  
 
Standpoint:  We accurately estimate how our audience thinks about 
an issue before we share our argument. 
 
Comprehension:  Our audience understands our argument.  
 
Force:  Our audience is justified to accept the argument’s 
conclusion after understanding our argument. 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Feedback:  We accurately interpret our audience’s behavioral 
reactions to our argument.   
 
These are the clarity conditions. The term “fog of debate” picks out circumstances in 
which the clarity conditions, whether all or in significant part, are not satisfied, making 
effective persuasion by argument fraught. One implication is that the fog of debate is 
heterogeneous; there are fogs of debate, we might say. And we can think of the fog as a 
gradable or spectral state, coming in degrees. This means there are marginal or borderline 
cases in which some clarity conditions hold but others do not.5  
An important point about the meaning of “fog of debate”: it has both an objective 
and a subjective reading. The fog can involve conscious awareness of the fog or not. The 
 
5 The possibility of marginal cases is worth a note. Suppose, for example, that Standpoint 
does not hold but the other clarity conditions do. Then it may be plausible to say that someone is 
not in a fog. To see why, suppose I don’t know how to accurately estimate where others stand on 
an issue before I share my argument. But I can potentially overcome that obstacle to effective 
debate if Comprehension, Force, and Feedback hold. As a further example, someone may be in a 
fog even if all of the clarity conditions hold except for Feedback. If all the information you receive 
about your audience’s reaction to your argument is systematically biased, you seem to be in a fog.  
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term is similar to “confused” in that respect. I can be said to be confused because I’m 
making a mistake, even if I am totally unaware that I’m making a mistake. Or I can be 
called confused because I’m feeling unsure and I’m aware that I could be making a 
mistake. So too with the fog of debate. Someone can be in a fog with or without awareness. 
That dual aspect of the term is worth noting in connection with the attributor’s 
perspective. From the first-person perspective, someone says “I am in the fog.” Self-
attributing that state normally implies someone is aware of the fog. But neither a second-
personal attribution (“You are in the fog”) nor a third-personal attribution (“They are in 
the fog”) implies that anyone is aware of the fog. Again, comparison with the term 
“confused” is useful. Saying “I am confused” normally implies that someone experiences 
confusion, whereas attributing confusion to others (“You are confused” or “They are 
confused”) does not. 
The word “debate” is meant to pick out someone’s attempt to show through 
argument that they are right and their opponent is wrong.6 This is the familiar sort of 
adversarial or antagonistic debate. There are other kinds of debate, to be sure. We can 
debate to uncover new ideas or perspectives, in which case nobody wins or loses. In a fact-
finding context, debate can be a means to bring out the truth, not to overcome an 
adversary. I will focus on debates where our goal is winning—changing an opponent’s 
mind—even though we may want to adjust our purposes after we learn of the fog. (In 
Section III, I consider that possibility.) 
To illustrate my account of the fog of debate, consider a case with no wisp of fog. 
Imagine we are trying to persuade an ideal audience: Socrates. He always asks for 
 




clarification when he does not understand a premise or an inference, using language that 
leaves us with no doubt about his thinking. He always reacts honestly to our arguments. 
Let’s also suppose we share with Socrates all relevant background evidence on whatever 
issues we discuss, and we know that. This means we can evaluate our own evidence in 
order to figure out whether Socrates is justified to accept an argument’s conclusion. All of 
this being so, whenever we try to persuade Socrates, we are well positioned to know when 
Standpoint, Comprehension, Force, and Feedback are met.  
When there are deviations from a pristine sort of situation like our debate with 
Socrates, the fog of debate can rise. But how does that happen, exactly? Which factors 
produce and exacerbate the fog? 
 
II. INCLEMENT CONDITIONS 
 
As noted, the fog comes when all or some clarity conditions fail to hold. 
Understanding what produces the fog is a matter of understanding which situations and 
processes erode or undercut the clarity conditions. That calls for empirical study, but first 
the conceptual and theoretical terrain needs to be mapped out. Philosophical effort can 
help. We can begin to make sense of the phenomena by practicing what Paul Rozin calls 
“informed curiosity.”7 In view of various examples and different types of data, we can try 
to make sense of the fog’s manifestations and significance in epistemic life. To that end, I 
will note findings from the social sciences and observations about persuasion, drawing 
distinctions and working through cases, in order to illuminate how the clarity conditions 
 
7 Paul Rozen, “Social Psychology and Science: Some Lessons From Solomon 
Asch,” Personality and Social Psychology Review 5, no. 1 (2001): 2–14. 
8 
 
can fail. I will also explain why people are often poorly positioned to recognize when those 
conditions fail. Being in the fog is bad enough. But things might become worse if we tend 
to deny that we are in it, when we are. Military commanders receive fragmentary and 
ambiguous reports but nevertheless feel confident that their perspective on the battlefield 
is luminously clear. That is how battles are lost.  
Begin with Standpoint—the idea that we accurately estimate our audience’s 
thinking about an issue before we share our argument. Psychologists and political 
scientists have asked whether partisans have accurate views of the attitudes and positions 
of their ideological opponents. One study from the early 1990s examined the attitudes of 
English professors at public and private universities in California.8 The survey queried 
the professors’ views on issues concerning the literary canon, such as “The aim of a liberal 
arts education should be to teach students a common cultural heritage,” “A literary text 
has several, equally correct interpretations,” and “Literature is best understood and 
taught when the instructor is of the same ethnicity and/or gender as the author.” 
Unsurprisingly, “traditionalist” and “revisionist” scholars were divided on the issues. 
What’s interesting is that partisans on both sides exaggerated the difference between 
themselves and their opponents. They even underestimated significant common ground 
on which books to select for the syllabus of an introductory course. The English professors 
thought they disagreed more than they did.  
Other studies show that partisans tend to have inaccurate views about the attitudes 
of out-group members.9 Political partisans tend to overestimate how extreme their 
 
8 Dacher Keltner and Robert J. Robinson, “Defending the Status Quo: Power and Bias in 
Social Conflict,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 23, no. 10 (1997): 1066–77. 
9 Robert J. Robinson, Dacher Keltner, Andrew Ward, and Lee Ross, “Actual Versus 
Assumed Differences in Construal: Naive realism in intergroup perception and conflict,” Journal 
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opponents’ views are.10 One tendency in interpersonal judgment, named false 
polarization, leads opponents to overestimate the gap between their positions.11 Partisans 
have also been found to believe they are more certain than members of the opposing side 
and to underestimate their opponents’ actual level of certainty.12 Some researchers found 
that partisans who had the most inaccurate judgments about opponents’ attitudes were 
the ones who most strongly identify with their ideology and were most involved in 
persuading others.13  
Failures of Standpoint can undermine our attempts to persuade. First, our 
arguments might flop. Being wrong about where other people stand makes us less likely 
to select arguments they will accept. We might commit the “straw man” fallacy, 
misrepresenting the audience’s position and then attacking the misrepresentation.14 
Second, if Standpoint doesn’t hold, we might inadvertently make our audience less 
receptive to arguments we put forward, even perfectly good ones they would otherwise 
 
of Personality and Social Psychology 68, no. 3 (1995): 404–417; John R. Chambers, Robert S. 
Baron, and Mary L. Inman, “Misperceptions in Intergroup Conflict: Disagreeing about What We 
Disagree About,” Psychological Science 17, no. 1 (2006): 38–45. 
10 Jacob Westfall, Leaf Van Boven, John R. Chambers, and Charles M. Judd, “Perceiving 
Political Polarization in the United States: Party Identity Strength and Attitude Extremity 
Exacerbate the Perceived Partisan Divide,” Perspectives on Psychological Science 10, no. 2 
(2015): 145–58. 
11 Emily Pronin, Carolyn Puccio, and Lee Ross, “Understanding Misunderstanding: Social 
Psychological Perspectives,” in T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, and D. Kahneman, eds., Heuristics and 
Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 
636–65 [at 651–53]; David K. Sherman, Leif D. Nelson, and Lee D. Ross, “Naïve Realism and 
Affirmative Action: Adversaries Are More Similar Than They Think,” Basic and Applied Social 
Psychology 25, no. 4 (2003): 275–89; Tim Kenyon, “False Polarization: Debiasing as Applied 
Social Epistemology,” Synthese 191 (2014): 2529–47. 
12 Craig W. Blatz and Brett Mercier, “False Polarization and False Moderation: Political 
Opponents Overestimate the Extremity of Each Other’s Ideologies but Underestimate Each 
Other’s Certainty,” Social Psychological and Personality Science 9, no. 5 (2018): 521–29. 
13 Westfall, Van Boven, Chambers, and Judd, “Perceiving Political Polarization in the 
United States,” 155. 
14 Douglas Walton, “The Straw Man Fallacy,” in J. van Bentham, F. van Eemeren, R. 
Grootendorst, and F. Veltman, eds., Logic and Argumentation (Amsterdam: Royal Netherlands 
Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1996), 115–28. 
10 
 
accept. Signaling to our audience that we believe they hold a more extreme position than 
they do hold could make them less receptive to what we say. It is like beginning a 
negotiation with an insulting opening offer. Attributing overly extreme views to others 
can fuel suspicion, distrust, and hostility. They will not see us as fair-minded or sincerely 
invested in discussion, but rather as uninformed, combative, or biased. When Standpoint 
fails in a debate, recovery can be difficult.  
But even if we start by judging correctly where our audience stands, that is no 
guarantee they will grasp our well-targeted arguments. This brings us to the matter of 
Comprehension—the condition that says the audience understands our argument. 
Comprehension can fail for many reasons. Audiences can be distracted, inattentive, or 
otherwise lack the resources of memory to keep the argument’s crucial details in mind. 
They may be unfamiliar with the technical terms or concepts the argument deploys. They 
may be listening only for the purpose of devising a sharp rejoinder to “own” us; but then 
they are not engaging, in the sense of seeing how our argument intersects with their own 
thinking.15  
Setting aside the audience’s limitations, we might inadvertently miscommunicate 
and share the “wrong” argument. One reason Comprehension fails turns on the subtle 
difference between the argument we rationally base our belief upon and the argument we 
use to persuade others to adopt that belief. We almost always express “argument 
sketches,” which function as compressed versions of more detailed arguments. John 
Pollock illustrates: 
 
15 Jack M. C. Kwong, “Open‐Mindedness as Engagement,” The Southern Journal of 
Philosophy 54, no. 1 (2016): 70–86.  
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Someone might think to himself, “Should I believe in God? Well, something 
had to create the universe, so there must be a God.” Someone else might 
think, “Well, if there were a God, there wouldn’t be so much evil in the 
world, so there can’t be a God.” As arguments, these are grossly incomplete, 
and notoriously difficult to complete.16  
 
An argument sketch, according to Pollock, “asserts that certain things are inferable on the 
basis of other things without actually working through the argument.”17 When going 
through an argument sketch, we are “meta-reasoning about the possibility of constructing 
[more detailed] arguments”: we are reasoning about what further reasoning we could 
do.18 This allows us to move rapidly toward a conclusion without getting bogged down in 
all the premises, subarguments for premises, and so on. Sketched arguments, as I think 
of them, include an implied “promissory note” or “IOU.” If I give you an argument sketch, 
it’s like I hand you an IOU. When you cash in the IOU, you can demand “payment”—in 
the form of a filled-out argument. Argument sketches can sometimes justify our beliefs. 
Sometimes, we will need to work through more details in order to have sufficient 
justification to accept a conclusion, especially if we have doubts about whether some 
sketch can be completed successfully. 
Comprehension can fail in predictable ways when we share argument sketches. 
Here’s why. If our audience has different evidence from ours, they might not be able to 
see what further parts of the argument could be filled in later or actually do the filling in. 
 
16 John Pollock, “Irrationality and Cognition,” in Quentin Smith, ed., Epistemology: New 
Essays (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 249–75 [at 260]. 




We might incorrectly assume they will know how to add the expansion themselves. It is a 
little like we are speaking in code, wrongly supposing the other party has the right 
decryption key. Or we could be unaware that they even need more information to grasp 
our argument, because we fail to see how their evidence diverges from ours. Sometimes 
our audience might wrongly presume our argument has a significant “hole” in it, not 
realizing it is a sketch. Since they do not see how the further details can work out, our 
argument looks like a non sequitur to them. In other cases, they might recognize that an 
argument is a sketch, but then “incorrectly” fill it in with uncharitable or dubious claims. 
Ideological opponents have a knack for misconstruing each other’s arguments. Being 
misinterpreted is frustrating—That’s not what I meant!—but since we nearly always 
present argument sketches in debate, failures of Comprehension should not be 
surprising.19  
When Comprehension goes sideways, will we know that? Not always and 
sometimes we might be inclined to believe Comprehension holds when it doesn’t. Seeing 
how our audience sees our argument is tricky. One important obstacle for perspective-
taking is called the “curse of knowledge,” the inability to think about an issue from a less 
informed perspective.20 Knowing more means knowing less about what it means to know 
 
19 Thinking about how Comprehension fails reminded me of some advice I picked up years 
ago from a philosophy teacher. There is a useful rule for reconstructing arguments called the 
charity principle: “When clarifying an argument, make the argument as sensible as you possibly 
can, given what its author said when presenting it” (E. J. Coffman, “Finding, Clarifying, and 
Evaluating Arguments,” no date, Philosophy Department, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, 
https://philpapers.org/archive/COFFCA.pdf [at 5]). That principle is not the advice I got from 
my teacher; he shared what I call the anti-charity principle. When preparing a draft manuscript 
for submission to a professional journal, invite some friends to interpret your arguments anti-
charitably, thereby helping you forestall bad objections from unsympathetic referees. (I am 
grateful to Klaas Kraay for his help and advice over the years.) 
20 Colin Camerer, George Loewenstein, and Martin Weber, “The Curse of Knowledge in 




less. And our knowledge of a topic blinds us to the ways in which uninformed people miss 
what is obvious to us. Because we see our argument as lucid, well structured, and easy to 
grasp, we might overlook the ways in which our audience simply does not get it.  
Despite the barriers to understanding, people sometimes receive our arguments in 
the intended form. Enter the third clarity condition, Force—the idea that our audience is 
justified to accept our argument’s conclusion after understanding it. Someone can grasp 
an argument perfectly well and yet not be justified to adopt its conclusion. Many 
arguments leave the audience discretion for how to react properly in this sense: after 
grasping our arguments, they may reject a premise or inference by appealing to further 
evidence. Insofar they have different total evidence than we do, we can expect they will 
sometimes rationally resist our arguments. What is justified for us could differ from what 
is justified for them, given differences between our total evidence and theirs.21  
But don’t some arguments foreclose all potential evasion? Can’t our reasoning 
occasionally force others to accept conclusions on pain of irrationality? One special brand 
of argument that rationally compels assent has been called a “knockdown argument.”22 If 
we share such an argument with our audience and Comprehension is satisfied, then Force 
is satisfied. But how common are knockdown arguments? Broad consensus among 
experts from many fields of science, mathematics, engineering, medicine, and history 
suggests that all sorts of claims are conclusively established—that electrons exist, that 
 
21 I assume here that insofar as what conclusions people are justified to accept depends on 
evidence, their total evidence matters (Thomas Kelly, “Evidence: Fundamental Concepts and the 
Phenomenal Conception,” Philosophy Compass 3, no. 5 [2008]: 933–55 [at 937–39]). 
Potentially, justification depends on factors over and above evidence, such as whether someone’s 
cognitive faculties are functioning property (Michael Bergmann, Justification Without 
Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006]). But 
non-evidentialist theories of justification are compatible with my assumption that insofar as 
evidence matters for the justification of argument-based beliefs, it is total evidence that matters. 
22 Nathan Ballantyne, “Knockdown Arguments,” Erkenntnis 79, no. 3 (2014): 525–43. 
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mosquitoes spread malaria, that the continents are in motion, that the Pythagorean 
theorem is correct, that human beings landed on the moon in 1969, that Oscar Peterson 
played the piano, and so forth. When experts reach a consensus, oftentimes that is 
because there is a knockdown argument. But are there such arguments for all positions 
concerning contentious questions of policy, morality, and philosophy? That is unclear. 
And even when contentious claims are supported by some unquestionably compelling 
argument, adequately sharing that argument with an audience is not always simple. Quick 
sketches won’t do. Consequently, in many debates, knockdown arguments are either 
unavailable or have not been fully shared with our audience in a form that would force 
assent. In those debates, our audience may evade our conclusion if their total evidence 
allows them to reject a premise or inference.  
So, Comprehension can hold even when Force does not—our audience could grasp 
our argument perfectly well yet be justified to reject its conclusion. But notice something 
interesting about our perception of Force: even when that condition does not hold, we 
could be biased to believe it does. The trouble lies in the fact that, in general, our 
judgments about other people are influenced by self-judgment. The Marquis de 
Vauvenargues, an eighteenth-century French writer, tersely depicted our predicament: 
“We are too inattentive or too much occupied with ourselves to understand each other.”23 
Contemporary psychologists offer models of interpersonal judgment according to which 
“people make judgments about others by making judgments about themselves, and only 
 
23 Marquis de Vauvenargues, Selections from the Characters, Reflexions and Maxims, 
translated with introductory notes and memoirs by Elizabeth Lee (Westminster, London: 
Archibald Constable and Co., 1903 [1746]), 184–85. 
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after the fact recognize potential differences between themselves and others.”24 Briefly, 
when trying to calculate what others think and feel, we mentally “trade places,” imagining 
ourselves in their situation. Instead of answering a question about them (“What are others 
justified to believe?”), we answer a question about ourselves (“What would I be justified 
to believe if I were in others’ situation?”). This shift leads to what psychologists call 
empathy gaps in perspective-taking, which conceal from us our opponents’ thinking and 
reasoning.25 An empathy gap opens when we project our actual thinking or feeling onto 
others who are in different states altogether. Even when there is no possible way for us to 
experience or feel what others do, we tend to lean on our personal experience for 
constructing others’ perspectives.26 Empathy gaps are commonplace in interpersonal 
judgment, but we are not adept at anticipating or overcoming them. In egocentric minds 
like ours, self-judgment becomes social judgment, though we do not necessarily see the 
difference.  
How could we improve? Our judgments concerning what others should think 
about our arguments need to be more sensitive to relevant information. One source of 
information is what people report or reveal about their thinking and reasoning. And so, 
at last, we have arrived at Feedback—the clarity condition that says we accurately 
interpret our audience’s behavioral reactions to our argument.  
 
24 Leaf Van Boven, George Loewenstein, David Dunning, and Loran F. Nordgren, 
“Changing Places: A Dual Judgment Model of Empathy Gaps in Emotional Perspective Taking,” 
in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Volume 48 (Cambridge, MA: Academic Press, 
2013), 117-71 [at 120]. 
25 George Loewenstein, “Hot-Cold Empathy Gaps and Medical Decision Making,” Health 
Psychology 24, no. 4 (2005): 49–56; Peter H. Ditto and Spassena P. Koleva, “Moral Empathy 
Gaps and the American Culture War,” Emotion Review 3, no. 3 (2011): 331–32; and Van Boven, 
Loewenstein, Dunning, and Nordgren, “Changing Places.” 
26 Van Boven, Loewenstein, Dunning, and Nordgren, “Changing Places,” 124–27. 
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Noticing how Feedback fails is important for understanding the fog of debate. 
Suppose we share a well-targeted argument that our audience grasps. And suppose we 
also believe they should accept the conclusion. But now we want to know their private, 
internal response. Did their thinking change because of the argument? If they resist the 
conclusion, why do they do so? Do they have good reasons? If they accept the conclusion, 
is their opinion based on the premises or did something else move them? Answering these 
questions well depends on whether Feedback holds.  
An analogy underscores the significance of Feedback. In military conflict, there are 
signs of victory. The fog of war may lift, revealing abandoned bunkers, wrecked artillery 
pieces, shell-shocked POWs, and bodies of the dead. These signs can mislead, but 
sometimes they let us accurately reconstruct a battle. In intellectual debate, however, the 
consequences of our argumentative efforts may remain entirely unknown. That is 
precisely what can happen when Feedback fails.  
I will note three types of cases in which Feedback does not hold. First, our audience 
might provide false or misleading feedback. People normally do not like to admit when 
they get a weighty argument to which they have no good reply. To save face, they might 
dishonestly report they think our argument is a flop. They could be unsettled in their 
thinking while outwardly projecting confidence. Consider how Emily Pronin, Carolyn 
Puccio, and Lee Ross describe participants in their laboratory:  
 
During contentious discussions, many individuals choose to remain silent [ 
. . . ]; those who do not remain silent generally hesitate to reveal any 
ambivalence in their beliefs. When addressing peers who seem to be on the 
other side of the issue, partisans seek mainly to defend their position rather 
17 
 
than share doubts or complexities in their beliefs, lest their “concessions” 
give their adversaries “ammunition.”27  
 
Our audience may not reveal that they are moved by our arguments, but they can also 
hide the fact that they are rationally unmoved. Consider one way that could happen. By 
sharing an argument, we signal to others that we care about an issue—perhaps much more 
than they do. And they know that by disclosing their objections they might get caught in 
an awkward or unwanted debate. Decorum demands faux agreement, at least in some 
cultures. Polite people smile and nod, pretending to be impressed with arguments they 
don’t accept, even ones they know are flawed.28  
People are adept at calculating what others want to hear. In one revealing study, 
Ara Norenzayan and Norbert Schwarz investigated how subjects’ tacit beliefs about a 
researcher’s epistemic goals influenced judgment.29 The study involved presenting 
subjects with a questionnaire that asked for explanations of a target person’s behavior. 
Norenzayan and Schwarz found the subjects gave more “situational” explanations when 
the letterhead of the questionnaire identified the researcher as a social scientist, 
compared to when the letterhead indicated the researcher was a personality psychologist. 
 
27 Emily Pronin, Carolyn Puccio, and Lee Ross, “Understanding Misunderstanding: Social 
Psychological Perspectives,” in T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, and D. Kahneman, eds., Heuristics and 
Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 
636–65 [at 652]. 
28 While traveling on airplanes, I learned the value of sharing false feedback. Seated and 
buckled in next to talkative cranks or extroverted ideologues, honesty is not necessarily the best 
policy. (“Well, thanks—I’ve always wanted to know how the Egyptian pyramids were built. I 
should get a bit of work wrapped up before we land in Chicago, but I’ll definitely check out that 
book you recommended.”) 
29 Ara Norenzayan and Norbert Schwarz, “Telling What They Want To Know: Participants 
Tailor Causal Attributions to Researchers’ Interests,” European Journal of Social Psychology 29, 
no. 8 (1999): 1011–20. 
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What they call the “letterhead effect” reveals that subjects adjusted their answers to the 
researcher’s epistemic goals—subjects believed a social scientist would be interested in 
situational causes of behavior, and a personality psychologist would be interested in 
dispositional ones. For better or worse, the norms that govern the sharing of feedback in 
debate are not focused merely on accuracy and truth. 
Social dynamics can distort or suppress feedback in many ways. For example, 
people might not say what they believe if they fear censure or rejection for expressing 
unpopular dissent.30 And powerful people, it is often observed, tend to attract proverbial 
Yes Men, who might not be men at all. “Of all forms of monotony,” wrote Joseph Joubert, 
“the monotony of affirmation is the worst.”31 People with authority and influence, 
including emperors with no clothes, too seldom get truthful negative feedback. The power 
they wield over others sets up a special type of “echo chamber” or “epistemic bubble”32 
inside which misleading feedback reigns. The Yes Men must be managed. A twentieth-
century historian, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., who studied political power and the U.S. 
Presidency, noted that the “intoxications of the office” should prompt a wise President to 
seek “passports to reality.”33 It is not only Presidents and other elites who need such 
passports. The monotony of affirmation is available today for anyone with an Internet 
connection and a social media account; your online followers can be become a cyber 
 
30 Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, “The Spiral of Silence: A Theory of Public 
Opinion,” Journal of Communication 24, no. 2 (1974): 43–51. 
31 Joseph Joubert, Pensées and Letters of Joseph Joubert, Translated with an introduction 
by H. P. Collins (Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1972 [1842]), 73. 
32 C. Thi Nguyen, “Echo Chambers and Epistemic Bubbles,” Episteme 17, no. 2 (2020): 
141–61. 




militia of Yes Men. Insofar as we do not correctly understand the dynamics that shape 
feedback, our interpretations might go wildly off track. 
Second, the audience can provide us with poor feedback. Teachers of critical 
thinking and informal logic know how their students, at the outset of a course, toss around 
unclear and imprecise language to evaluate arguments. Someone might be thinking of a 
good objection to our argument but her description does not enlighten us. Expressions 
like “bad argument,” “it’s wrong,” “that can’t be right,” or “that doesn’t flow” are 
ambiguous in many contexts. Maybe the speaker means that an argument’s conclusion 
does not follow from the premises, that an explicitly stated premise is false, that an 
implicit premise is false, and so on. Poor feedback makes it hard for us to judge others’ 
reactions accurately. Sometimes, someone might not have any principled resistance to 
our argument but only feels its conclusion is wrong.34 Plausibly, a great deal of moral and 
political disagreement among partisans arises from “affective differences [that] are 
difficult to identify and verbalize.”35 Our audience’s stated objection to our argument may 
or may not reveal their real hang-up with the argument. This is because expressed 
objections do not always indicate the actual source of doubt, as we see when someone’s 
objections are addressed but her doubt remains. 
So far, I have noted how Feedback can fail due to false and poor feedback from our 
audience. A third possibility is that we process our audience’s feedback in biased ways 
and do not receive the right message. Here are a few possibilities: (i) we uncharitably 
 
34 On other occasions, metacognitive feelings come prior to any effortful analysis but the 
feelings are accurate indicators of validity, as demonstrated by Kinga Morsanyi and Simon J. 
Handley, “Logic Feels So Good—I like it! Evidence for Intuitive Detection of Logicality in 
Syllogistic Reasoning,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition 38, no. 3 (2012): 596–616. 
35 Ditto and Koleva, “Moral Empathy Gaps and the American Culture War,” 332. 
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interpret their words, misconstruing their good objection as a bad one; (ii) we cynically 
interpret their negative reactions as an indication they are in fact moved by our reasoning 
and trying to save face; or (iii) we mistake their ambivalent or lukewarm reactions as 
indicating our argument is compelling.  
Take one example of the third error. Suppose you are trying to gauge how 
persuasive your arguments should be for others. You might rely too much on your own 
sense that your arguments are compelling. Those arguments make the conclusions seem 
obvious or even self-evident—for you. But your prior belief about the arguments’ 
persuasiveness leads you to decipher feedback, especially ambiguous feedback, in such a 
way that confirms your prior belief. Someone could remark, “Huh, interesting argument,” 
“I hadn’t thought about that before,” or “Let me think more about it.” These reactions 
could mean many things. For one, the feedback may be false because your audience wants 
to move on with the conversation or avoid conflict. But if you assume your arguments are 
forceful, you are prone to construe such feedback as more positive than the evidence 
warrants. As a result, you will be more likely to see arguments as “direct hits” even when 
they were only marginally effective or not at all. As noted above, self-judgment can 
transmute into social judgment when we evaluate what others should think. Similarly, 
our personal evaluation of our arguments can shape what we think about how others 
evaluate them.  
The fog of debate is not inevitable. Communication about arguments often works 
well enough; I hypothesize that it works in those cases because the clarity conditions hold, 
more or less. But various aspects of conversation and cognition easily undermine the 
clarity conditions and, unfortunately, we cannot always recognize when those conditions 
fail. Discussions of complex questions or value-laden issues invite trouble.  
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Before I turn to the practical matter of what we might do, let me note a topic so far 
unmentioned: the role of the medium of communication in thickening the fog. Here is a 
natural question for denizens of an Internet-connected world. Do certain forms of online 
exchange contribute to the fog? Perhaps under the influence of technologists’ hype, many 
people embrace the idea that computer networks “bring us closer together.” That may be 
true in a sense—but only because the Internet introduces much greater “distance” in other 
respects.  
Information available in face-to-face exchange is missing on social media 
platforms: tone of voice, acoustical properties of speech such as pitch and volume, facial 
expressions, body language, situational explanations for users’ behavior, and so on. 
Cyberspace was not built to help us understand others’ minds. Researchers have found 
that people readily use paralinguistic cues in speech to infer others’ mental processing, 
but since these cues are absent in texts, hearing people explain their beliefs makes them 
seem more mentally capable and more human than reading identical explanations.36 
Further, the ties between online communicators can be quite “weak”37 and some users 
end up “alone together,” feeling alienated, anxious, and emotionally exhausted despite—
and because of—near-constant “connection” to other users.38 Users can cloak themselves 
in anonymity, misleading others about their real beliefs and identities.  
 
36 Juliana Schroeder, Michael Kardas, and Nicholas Epley, “The Humanizing Voice: 
Speech Reveals, and Text Conceals, a More Thoughtful Mind in the Midst of 
Disagreement,” Psychological Science 28, no. 12 (2017): 1745–62. 
37 Eric Gilbert and Karrie Karahalios, “Predicting Tie Strength with Social Media,” 
in Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (2009): 
211–20.  
38 Sherry Turkle, Alone Together: Why We Expect More from Technology and Less from 
Each Other (New York: Basic Books, 2011). 
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Questions about how different communication mediums influence argumentative 
persuasion are beyond the scope of this essay. Even so, it appears some online forums 
provide ideal circumstances for the fog of debate. The more we constrict our 
argumentative communication by making it increasingly less similar to conversation or 
long-form writing, the more the audience becomes hidden from our view. Some of these 
platforms exhibit a distressing mixture of elements: ultra-brief, non-face-to-face 
communication shaped by social networks where the inducements for rhetoric, signaling, 
and outrage are everything. Careful thinking, evidence, and the truth are left behind. “We 
have asked for truth; we have been given gadgets,” quipped the philosopher T. V. Smith.39 
 
III. WAITING FOR THE FOG TO CLEAR 
 
The fog of debate arises through the routine workings of communication and 
cognition. We should consider what to do about it. As much as I am bothered by the fog 
and would like it to dissipate, significantly changing our practices of argument-giving 
might not be sensible in some circumstances. So, let me note two policies that would allow 
us to continue our standard approach to debate even after we become aware of the fog.  
One policy is suggested by Georg Christoph Lichtenberg in the quotation in the 
Introduction of this essay. An eighteenth-century German physicist and aphorist, 
Lichtenberg said that the purpose of his writing was not to convince his opponents with 
arguments, but to “annoy them” and “make it known to others that they have not 
 
39 T. V. Smith, “The Tragic Realm of Truth,” The Philosophical Review 45, no. 2 (1936): 
111–25 [at 113]. 
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convinced us.”40 According to what I will call the Lichtenbergian policy, debate is for 
stirring up feelings in other people, not for persuasion; so, the fog of debate is nothing to 
worry about. 
The basic idea can be clarified. Argumentative communication is a type of speech 
act. Expressing an argument can have different effects: persuading one’s opponents, 
annoying one’s opponents, rallying one’s allies, making oneself feel good, and so on. 
Following taxonomy from J. L. Austin’s work on speech acts, those effects are 
perlocutions: acts done by saying something. Here is a way to describe what goes awry 
when we haphazardly fling an argument at our opponents through the fog: the perlocution 
of persuading our opponents is not a plausible outcome of communication. But if we know 
in advance that the perlocution is ill fated, we could intend a different perlocution—an 
effect that is easier for us to bring about from inside the fog. That is the Lichtenbergian 
policy. Persuading opponents is an unrealistic goal. Instead, we argue to annoy our 
opponents or to rally our allies. Our argumentative communication is a signal to others: 
“No, I’m not joining the Dark Side!” and “You foolish deplorables have the stupidest 
arguments!”41 
In fairness, the Lichtenbergian policy may be an apt description of what is 
sometimes called “argument.” But the policy will not satisfy us if we are committed to 
using reasons and evidence to persuade. From the mere fact that our efforts to persuade 
are ineffective in a debate, it does not follow that we should now use argument merely to 
 
40 Georg Christoph Lichtenberg, The Waste Books. Translated and with Introduction by 
R. J. Hollingdale (New York: New York Review Book, 1990 [1775–1776]), 67. 
41 For discussion of attributions of malice and stupidity in conflicts, see Nathan Ballantyne 




stir up feelings in our opponents or allies. Setting that point aside, even if we feel the pull 
of this policy, we may worry whether it universalizes. Ask yourself: Would you want your 
opponents to treat their arguments as tools for annoying you? Perhaps not. If they could 
possibly teach you something, you would presumably want them to persist intelligently 
and creatively to try to get the message through. And since you believe you have 
something they ought to know, why not continue trying, as you think they should do unto 
you? 
Consider a second policy meant to maintain the argumentative status quo. We can 
continue to share arguments, intending to persuade, because we think that engaging in 
debate is our best means to understand our audience’s thinking. Knowing about the fog 
calls us to carry on as before, because arguing might lift the fog. Call this the persistence 
policy. It reminds me of a sentiment expressed by G. E. Moore. In his Principia Ethica, 
Moore lamented the “peculiarly unsatisfactory state” of philosophy, owing to the fact 
there is no consensus about philosophical questions ‘‘as there is about the existence of 
chairs and lights and benches.”42 Moore continued: 
 
I should therefore be a fool if I hoped to settle one great point of controversy, 
now and once for all. It is extremely improbable I shall convince. [ . . . ] 
Philosophical questions are so difficult, the problems they raise are so 
complex, that no one can fairly expect, now, any more than in the past, to 
win more than a very limited assent. And yet I confess that the 
considerations which I am about to present appear to me to be absolutely 
 
42 G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903), 45. 
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convincing. I do think that they ought to convince, if only I can put them 
well. In any case, I can but try. I shall try now to put an end to that 
unsatisfactory state of things, of which I have been speaking.43 
 
Though he did not say it, Moore might have thought something like the fog of debate 
contributed to the lack of consensus among philosophers. He was acutely aware of the 
dangers of merely verbal disputes,44 one possible consequence of the fog, and that 
awareness led him tirelessly to disambiguate the claims he was making from those he 
wasn’t. I would suspect that finding out he was fogged in would not have stopped Moore 
from trying to convince philosophical colleagues. 
In the right circumstances, arguing with people can certainly reveal to us their 
thinking. But recall we have significant doubts about our capacities to know what our 
audience thinks. We could keep launching our arguments at them, but what will we learn, 
given our doubts? The persistence policy seems to ignore the difficulty of carrying on 
while aware of a fog. Suppose we are prospectively considering whether to share an 
argument with our audience. Familiar questions arise. Is this argument well aimed at our 
audience? Would they understand it? Would they reasonably accept the conclusion after 
grasping it? Would we interpret their feedback accurately? Importantly, being aware of 
the fog means we will not have reasons for affirmative answers to all or some of these 
questions. But insofar as we cannot answer them affirmatively, we will often be unsure 
whether, and how, to proceed. After all, we know that lobbing another argument could 
jeopardize our persuasive efforts in the future. We should slow down and consider our 
 
43 Ibid., 45. 
44 Ibid., vii. 
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options. Just as military commanders operate differently once they recognize the 
obscurity of battlefield judgment, so it goes for thinkers who are aware of the fog of 
debate.  
This hints at a rule of thumb. Whenever we have expended considerable effort 
trying to convince our opponents, without success, but feel confident they are finally in 
the crosshairs of our arguments, think again. On careful reflection, we may decide, like 
Moore, that we should persevere in trying to persuade others with our arguments—“if 
only I can put them well.” Or we may decide, like Lichtenberg, that annoying our 
opponents or rallying our allies is the best we can accomplish for now.45  
But I want to draw attention to a further possibility. While thinking again, we 
should see the difference between arguing and preparing to argue. We should sometimes 
ask how best to devise, deliver, and defend arguments to our audience. A warfare analogy 
is illuminating here. One lesson of the fog of war might be to stand down. When the enemy 
is elusive, a military force can deploy spies, listening stations, and high-altitude 
reconnaissance aircraft to identify strategic opportunities and tactical vulnerabilities. 
Commanders take counsel from intelligence officers, run war-game scenarios, and study 
the history of war. To prepare for conflict, commanders gather intelligence.  
In the shift from arguing to preparing to argue, I envision various kinds of 
“intelligence gathering ops” and “tradecraft.” These would help thinkers overcome the fog 
of debate. How would this work? What are effective techniques? Well, I don’t pretend to 
 
45 Do I think anyone should follow the Lichtenbergian policy? Maybe occasionally, though 
only cautiously. Here is one type of situation that may justify the policy. Sometimes our 
adversaries do not care one whit about the truth; we know this because they tell us so. They fling 
mud, not arguments. Intellectuals are naturally uncomfortable with the sophists’ dirty tricks. But 
we who care deeply about reason and evidence can use rhetoric and passion to inoculate other 
people against the sophists. We could be called upon to safeguard the pursuit of truth in our 
community using every rhetorical weapon available. (Thanks to Shane Wilkins for discussion.) 
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know—I would just like to find out. We could benefit from knowing some empirically 
tested techniques. 
Fog reduction requires knowing how to change social and cognitive processes and 
activities. It is unclear how optimistic we can be for large improvements. Some 
circumstances plunge us into impenetrable fog. Although we know that the fog is to some 
extent caused and sustained by different cognitive biases, our knowledge about how de-
biasing works is limited.46 But if researchers can understand how to mitigate fog, small 
improvements might pay off. To the best of my knowledge, there is no established body 
of theory that we can take directly “off the shelf” for application in fog elimination. 
Researchers studying the social dynamics of knowledge production and social conflict 
could have useful insights, including researchers from social psychology, counseling 
psychology, conflict resolution, sociology of knowledge, and history of science. Human 
beings frequently seek to overcome uncertainty and confusion in interpersonal judgment 
and argumentative communication. What has worked for them? How can we find out 
what works for us?  
If researchers can tell us how to lift the fog, we should scrutinize our academic 
institutions and research practices to ensure they are set up to minimize fog. I strongly 
suspect that some relevant knowledge takes the form of know-how and practical wisdom. 
 
46 Norbert Schwarz, Lawrence J. Sanna, Ian Skurnik, and Carolyn Yoon, “Metacognitive 
Experiences and the Intricacies of Setting People Straight: Implications for Debiasing and Public 
Information Campaigns,” Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 39 (2007): 127–61; Scott 
O. Lilienfeld, Rachel Ammirati, and Kristin Landfield, “Giving Debiasing Away: Can Psychological 
Research on Correcting Cognitive Errors Promote Human Welfare?” Perspectives on 
Psychological Science 4, no. 4 (2009): 390–98; Stephan Lewandowsky, Ullrich K. H. Ecker, 
Colleen M. Seifert, Norbert Schwarz, and John Cook, “Misinformation and Its Correction: 
Continued Influence and Successful Debiasing,” Psychological Science in the Public Interest 13, 
no. 3 (2012): 106–31. 
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Reducing the fog is a matter of repositioning ourselves, seeing situations differently. Here 
are a few examples for further reflection.  
For all of their talking and typing, some intellectuals are less skilled at listening 
than would be desirable. Arguing in a confident and decisive style is celebrated more than 
listening well. Brenda Ueland, a twentieth-century American journalist, described 
“censorious listening,” where a listener is an “ungenerous eavesdropper who mentally (or 
aloud) keeps saying as you talk, ‘Bunk . . . Bunk . . . Hokum’.”47 Some academics, maybe 
philosophers especially, are trained to be censorious listeners; their job is to detect, and 
root out, error and illogic.48 Listening will not get you tenure. At any rate, hearing what 
people are saying about their standpoint and their ways of thinking might clear away some 
fog. In their work on false polarization, David Sherman, Leif Nelson, and Lee Ross found 
that “when partisans are confronted with the actual views of their opponents (which are 
more similar to their own than they think), they are apt to see much more common ground 
between the sides and be much more optimistic about negotiating their differences.”49  
But, as noted above, social dynamics can block accurate feedback. Even when we 
can hear others, they might not dish. “Are you listening,” asked Joseph Joubert, “to the 
 
47 Brenda Ueland, “Tell Me More: On the Fine Art of Listening,” In Strength to Your 
Sword Arm: Selected Writings (Duluth, MN: Holy Cow! Press, 1993), 205–210 [at 210]. 
48 E. J. Coffman shared Thomas Senor’s remarks (Thomas D. Senor, “Still More Advice to 
Christians in Philosophy,” Logoi [Spring 2015]: 6–8. 
https://philreligion.nd.edu/assets/280358/logoi_spring.2015.pdf) on the theme of “censorious 
listening” at academic philosophy conferences: 
We go to philosophy talks to poke holes in the speaker’s main argument, or to show 
that something important was overlooked. We are there as much to instruct as we 
are to learn—and this is so even if we don’t take ourselves to know as much about 
the subject of the talk than the speaker does. Our hands shoot up when the Q&A 
starts because we want to get in our own clever objection before someone beats us 
to it. (7)  
 
49 Sherman, Nelson, and Ross, “Naïve Realism and Affirmative Action,” 276. 
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ones who keep quiet?”50 An unforthcoming audience could call for something not unlike 
a spy’s tradecraft. I will describe a technique used by a friend of mine. He is an academic 
in the United States and, like most American academics, he has liberal political opinions. 
But unlike most, my friend has a non-American accent, which lets him pass as a tourist. 
Sometimes, he casually asks people for their thoughts on political issues, letting them 
assume he is unfamiliar with some divisive, hot-button affair. In return, he receives 
reports that other liberal academics are unlikely ever to hear from their conservative 
neighbors. People are candid with my friend because they do not attribute to him the 
biases and defects they reactively attribute to PhDs who work in universities.  
Slipping into the ranks of an out-group can give us insight into how the “other side” 
really thinks. Let me share two examples about a philosophical debate concerning the 
nature of the mind. Note that latter-day academic philosophers as a group strongly tend 
to accept physicalism—the thesis that mental properties are, or are reducible to, physical 
properties. A recent survey found more than half of respondents accepted physicalism 
while only about one quarter accepted non-physicalist views.51 In philosophy, as 
elsewhere, thinking carefully and creatively about the alternatives to a dominant 
viewpoint can be a struggle. Conventional notions come to seem obvious or inevitable. 
Jaegwon Kim, who taught at Brown University in the Philosophy Department for 
many years, affirmed physicalism for part of his career. But then Kim began to worry that 
physicalism could not accommodate facts about consciousness and mental causation. 
What could a sensible departure from physicialism look like? As he continued to patiently 
 
50 Joseph Joubert, The Notebooks of Joseph Joubert, translated and with an introduction 
by Paul Auster (New York: New York Review Book, 2005 [1791]), 13. 
51 David Bourget and David J. Chalmers, “What Do Philosophers Believe?” Philosophical 
Studies 170, no. 3 (2014): 465–500. 
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explore physicalism in his work, he decided to visit the University of Notre Dame, where 
he taught a series of graduate seminars between 1999 and 2005. One of Kim’s motivations 
for visiting Notre Dame was the eclectic group he found in its Philosophy Department: 
some philosophers there accepted unpopular non-physicalist views concerning the 
metaphysics of mind, such as substance dualism, neutral monism, idealism, as well as an 
off-beat physicalist view, eliminative materialism. Kim told his friends and colleagues that 
he found the diversity of thought refreshing and stimulating for his ongoing research.52  
Getting inside other theories does not always require talking to people who hold 
them. It could be that we need to do some talking ourselves. At the same time Jaegwon 
Kim was visiting Notre Dame, William Lycan was teaching at the University of North 
Carolina. Like Kim, Lycan had invested considerable energy in the philosophy of mind. 
Lycan reports that he has found physicalism compelling “all my adult life, since first I 
considered the mind-body issue.”53 Back in the 1980s, Lycan had written a book that 
dismissed dualism by rehearsing stock counterarguments. But then in the spring 
semester of 2006, Lycan taught a graduate seminar on the mind-body problem and 
decided to play the role “of a committed dualist as energetically as I could.” Taking on the 
mantle of the dualist was, he says, “a strange feeling, something like being a cat burglar 
for a few months.”54 Lycan reports that his dialectical role-playing showed him the defects 
of arguments against dualism. Those arguments he had originally thought were so 
compelling were not persuasive on closer inspection. He was ultimately led to compare 
 
52 Thanks to Fritz Warfield for email correspondence (September 2020) about Jaegwon 
Kim’s visits to South Bend, Indiana. 
53 William G. Lycan, On Evidence in Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 
66. 
54 Ibid., 66, n. 8. 
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his physicalist perspective to a political or religious ideology: “my own faith in 
materialism,” Lycan confesses, “is based on science-worship.”55, 56 
To prepare for debate, we can surround ourselves with opponents or pretend to be 
those opponents. We can listen carefully to them or study their writings rigorously and 
generously. One possibility is that we will come to think anew about not only their 
thinking but ours as well. Our preparation could be humbling, teaching us how tenuous 
our arguments are and how elusive the truth can be. We see dimly through the fog. Even 
our confidence about who our opponents are might become unsettled, as when our 
debates turn out to be merely verbal. “When two persons sit and converse in a thoroughly 
good understanding,” Ralph Waldo Emerson observed, “the remark is sure to be made, 
See how we have disputed about words!”57 By holding back on debate for a little while, by 
preparing our best arguments to share, we might make peace with our adversaries—even 




55 Ibid., 68, n. 11. 
56 Some of the material in this paragraph is adapted from Nathan Ballantyne, “Review of 
William G. Lycan’s On Evidence in Philosophy,” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, January 4, 
2020, https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/on-evidence-in-philosophy/. 
57 Ralph Waldo Emerson, “New England Reformers,” in The Essential Writings of Ralph 
Waldo Emerson. Modern Library Paperback Edition (New York: Random House (2000 [1844]), 
402–420 [at 416]. 
